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"It is a victory for consumerism and common sense."  
 
Etain Doyle, Director of Ireland's regulator ComReg (then Telecommunications 
Regulation), commenting the decision to award 3G Irish licenses through a "beauty 
contest".1
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is often alleged that high auction prices for spectrum licenses have inhibited the 
deployment of the related services, to the detriment of consumers.  For example, 
telecom specialist John Tennant said that the bids on the third generation, or 3G, 
licenses increased the cost of debt service to the point that the companies could not 
borrow for infrastructure development, and ultimately accounts for the dramatic drop in 
share prices of the telecom sector.  (McClelland, 2003).  Similarly, an EC report 
studying 3G services identifies the €110 billion paid for licenses as a major constraint on 
investment.  Several nations, including Finland, France, Ireland, Spain and Sweden, 
awarded 3G licenses for low prices not set by auction, using what are often called 
"beauty contests," ostensibly because this would lead to a faster deployment of services 
(Commission of the EC, 2002).  Dr Keiji Tachikawa, president of Japan’s largest cellular 
company (NTT DoCoMo), agrees: 
"Operators will have to pass on the added cost [of auctioned licences] to 
consumers. This could be a hurdle for the spread of 3G."2
We investigate the properties of auctions, from a perspective of consumer 
welfare, under the extreme assumption that the bidders face salient financing 
constraints.  This makes it theoretically possible for the critics to be right, that financing 
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constraints inhibit the deployment of services.  We show that auctions still maximize 
consumer surplus, including license revenue, provided the elasticity of demand is above 
certain threshold.   
Textbook economic analysis suggests that license prices are sunk costs by the 
time investment decisions are made, and thus should have no effect on the deployment 
of services.  Moreover, if profitability of deployment varies across countries, one might 
expect the high profitability countries to attract both high auction prices and rapid and 
extensive deployment to capture the high profitability, inducing a positive correlation 
between auction prices and service deployment. Even if profitability is constant, the 
fallacy of sunk costs suggests, in addition, that psychologically the managers should 
want to invest more in the regions with high-priced licenses, not less. 
On the other hand, starting with Michael Jensen’s 1986 free cash flow concepts, 
modern corporate finance emphasizes the importance of restraining managers by 
limiting their ability to invest.  Moral hazard, in the form of career concerns or limited 
liability, can induce managers to take excess risks.  The natural response to such 
managerial problems is to limit the ability of the manager to make bad choices, either by 
imposing a budget constraint on the manager, or requiring the manager to use a much 
higher discount factor than the actual average cost of capital for a project under 
consideration.  Even if budgets are "soft," in the sense that there is always more money 
possible, individual executives may bear a career cost of asking for more money, 
perhaps because they are seen as having mis-estimated the costs, making them 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 3G Auctions: A License To Bill? by Nicki Hayes,  
http://www.wirelessdevnet.com/channels/wireless/features/licensetobill.html, last visited May 22nd, 2006. 
2 Business Week, October 16, 2000, p.25. 
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hesitate to request more money unless the gains are very large.  Such a situation 
mirrors a financing constraint, at least for some realizations of costs. 
The recognition that agency problems -- either moral hazard or asymmetric 
infomation or both -- might have an impact on corporate financing and investment 
probably begins with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), which argues that asymmetric 
information can impede credit markets, and Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), 
which argues that equity financing does not cure the agency problem created by 
asymmetric information.  Another important paper was Myers and Majluf’s 1984 
analysis that asymmetric information can drive a wedge between the interests of new 
investors and creditors, thereby creating an agency problem distinct from that identified 
by the Stiglitz and Weiss.  Lewis and Sappington (1989a, 1989b), and Greenwood and 
McAfee (1991) show that asymmetric information can lead to inflexible rules, and in 
particular may fix capital investment at a level unaffected by the state of the world 
unless the state is very extreme.  These rules work precisely like a financing constraint 
provided to a manager.  Hart and Moore (1995) develop Jensen’s free cash flow 
concept, and show that debt seniority can be used as a versatile instrument to induce 
more efficient project selection.  In particular, a mix of "hard" debt, which cannot be 
postponed, and soft debt create a limit on the ability to raise future capital, thus inducing 
future financing constraints.  Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) develop a dynamic model 
in which borrowing constraints arise endogenously and relax as the value of the 
prospects of the firm improves.  Overall, the thrust of the theoretical literature is that 
budget or financing constraints imposed on firm managers play an important role in 
ameliorating incentive problems. 
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Many empirical tests corroborate the view that firms are financially-constrained to 
some degree, by showing that internal and external financing are not perfect 
substitutes.  The theme of the empirical studies is that investment decisions are affected 
by the amount of cash on hand in the firm.  Fazzari and Athey (1987) show that the 
availability of internal financing affects investment.  Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988) emphasize financing constraints in their study of the determinants of investment.  
Whited (1992) corroborates the existence of financing constraints.  Fazzari and 
Petersen (1993) use working capital as a way of controlling for errors in measured 
variables that might create the spurious appearance of financial constraints, and finds 
evidence that previous studies had in fact underestimated the importance of financing 
constraints.  More recently, Love (2003) estimates the effects of financing constraints 
across many nations, and finds that strong capital markets in developed nations reduce, 
but don’t eliminate, the significance of financing constraints.3 If these studies are 
relevant to the telecom firms, then the cost of spectrum licenses could have an impact 
on investment in deployment of services. 
The behavior of the telecom industry during the 1990s reinforces the importance 
of managerial incentive problems.  Some companies bid in excess of the maximum 
values suggested by their own analyses.  Stefan Zehle describes a 3G bidder in the 
U.K. who bid £5 billion for a license that the company estimated was worth £1 billion.  
He also describes an executive who called the auctions a "spectrum landgrab" and that 
the bidders should not worry whether the prices made business sense (McClelland, 
                                                 
3 The empirical literature is also discussed in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). Although larger, mature 
firms are typically subject to less serious financing constraints, Whited (1992) concluded that financial 
constraints are still important for large firms. Moreover, even for these firms, asymmetric information is the 
element that is stressed, and it should be important for firms in a new market, like 3G services. 
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2003).4  One author (McAfee) was repeatedly asked by spectrum bidders for auction-
theoretic reasons for bidding in excess of the net present value.  The managers were 
very disappointed to hear about the winner’s curse, which goes the other direction.5  In 
addition, many of the bidders believed that other bidders faced financing constraints and 
consulted with economists in an attempt to estimate just what those constraints might 
be.  
In a world of possibly financially constrained firms, do auctions maximize 
consumer surplus, counting the revenue raised by the auction as part of consumer 
surplus?6  We characterize conditions under which auctions yield an optimal price from 
the perspective of consumers, in spite of the presence of binding financing constraints.  
Rather than explicitly consider auctions, we consider a posted price, which 
simplifies the analysis.  This price may range from zero to a maximum where the firms 
earn zero profits.  Generally the zero profit point is the price that would emerge from an 
auction among symmetric firms; financing constraints are salient if they strictly bind at 
this price. 
                                                 
4 For an opposing view of the European 3G auctions, see Klemperer (2002). 
5 The likely reason for this tendency to bid in excess of net present value was the 1980s experience.  The 
actual number of U.S. cell phone users in 1990 was ten times the expectation projected in 1980 for 1990, 
and cellular profits represented a large fraction of total telecom profits, mostly because there were only 
two firms in most regions and limited capacity.  This dramatic underestimate of the value of wireless 
fueled an unjustified optimism. 
6 Auctions with budget constraints have been examined by Pitchik and Schotter (1986, 1988), Che and 
Gale (1988), and Benoit and Krishna (2001). The focus of these papers is on the firms’ ability to bid in 
subsequent auctions, given the prices paid in earlier auctions, and on the proposition that bidders might 
artificially inflate the price of earlier sales as a means of reducing the ability of the winners to pay for later 
items.  In contrast, we examine the ability of firms to deploy a service after the sale. Haan and Toolsema 
(2003) introduce credit rationing due to market uncertainty and limited liability in a model of license 
allocation, providing an alternative source of "budget constraints". In their model, higher nominal interest 
rates (debt burden) induce firms to take a more aggressive behavior in the market, due to the assumption 
that uncertainty is resolved after market competition. 
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If the elasticity of demand, ε, exceeds 1 + 1/n evaluated at the (Cournot) 
unconstrained output, where n is the number of licenses, then the price where financing 
constraints just bind falls short of the consumer surplus-maximizing price. In fact, if the 
consumer surplus is convex in output (a case which arises with linear demand) then the 
consumer-surplus maximizing price is always the auction price. If consumer surplus is 
concave (e.g. constant elasticity of demand), then ε exceeding 1 + 1/n is a necessary 
condition for auctions to be optimal.  A sufficient condition in this instance is that no 
more than (ε-1)/ε of the budget is spent on the licenses. 
The formulas we derive are well rooted in economic analysis, e.g. they are the 
natural counterpart of Ramsey pricing in the regulation of natural monopoly. Also, they 
have the virtue of being simple and readily checkable. In particular, in the United States 
PCS auctions, licenses costs were estimated to be about 40% of the costs of deploying 
a PCS service.  Even if the firms were financially constrained, and even if consumer 
surplus was concave, an auction was consumer surplus-maximizing provided the 
elasticity of demand for PCS services exceeded 1.66.  We argue in Section 5 that the 
demand for new wireless services is elastic.7  Under that assumption, even if the critics 
are right that auctions curtail output (deployment) relative to beauty contests, auctions 
nonetheless are in the best interest of consumers. 
Auctions have an important advantage that is not considered in this paper – auctions 
tend to pick the most able companies.  This advantage is set aside to provide a stronger 
case for using beauty contests, since reducing the advantages of auctions makes our 
                                                 
7 Over the rollout of PCS services, prices have dropped by 50% or so, and the number of customers has 
grown by at least several hundred percent, suggesting elasticities over 4.  However, the technology has 
changed substantially as well, with smaller phones with many more features like cameras and instant 
messaging, which may account for some of the increased sales.   
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conclusion that auctions are nonetheless optimal even stronger. Other simplifying 
assumptions have this same effect of making the case stronger for beauty contests. We 
comment on some of them in Section 4 . In general, the model is stylized for clarity but 
we anticipate the effects identified to carry over to more elaborate settings, although of 
course new phenomena may crop up in such settings. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The second section develops the basic Cournot 
theory and the third section proves the main results.  The fourth section considers 
whether auctions produce the zero profit price, when this price is unique, and shows 
that the theory is robust to asymmetries in the budget.  The fifth section considers the 
application of the theory to the European experience with 3G services.  The sixth 
section concludes. 
2. The Model 
There are n licenses, and at least n+1 identical firms.  A license is a right to 
compete in a symmetric Cournot industry. 8   We discuss below alternative assumptions 
(e.g., price competition). If industry output is Q, then the realized price is p(Q). 
The elasticity of demand is 
(1) 
)Q(pQ
)Q(p)Q( ′
−=ε . 
                                                 
8 We assume the Cournot model not because it is necessarily the best model of any specific industry but 
primarily for its tractability.  However, using the homogeneous-good, Cournot model makes our analysis 
comparable to many other regulation studies, and has the added advantage that the effects of budget 
constraints have a natural interpretation in the Cournot model.  In contrast, in a differentiated products 
model, the effects of budget constraints could be to limit capacity but could also affect the dissimilarity of 
the products.  In addition, differentiated product models are notoriously challenging to analyze.  However, 
the analysis of such models represents the natural next step.  Competition among cellular telephone 
companies has both a quantity and a differentiated product aspect.  For part of their history, the cell 
companies have been capacity constrained, and these capacity constraints are alleviated by the denser 
deployment of towers.  With respect to 3G services, however, differentiation is an important aspect of 
competition, although even there, investments needed to deploy any 3G services were slow in coming. 
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Where the risk of confusion is minimal, we will suppress the dependence of ε on 
Q.  We assume that for all Q, 
(2) . 02 <′′+′ )Q(pQ)Q(p
Inequality (2) is the condition that marginal revenue is downward sloping, and insures 
that the second order conditions hold globally for Cournot equilibrium. 
Let λ be the price of a license, and B the budget of each firm.  We model the 
financing constraint as a "hard" budget constraint, primarily to favor the case that 
financing constraints might interfere with subsequent production.  That is, "soft" budget 
or financing constraints are generally going to have less of an effect than "hard" 
financing constraints.  Also, as we will show in the next section, if firms are 
asymmetrically constrained the case for auctions is actually stronger. If a firm chooses 
to produce the quantity q, the constraint becomes 
(3) , Bcq ≤λ+
where c is the marginal cost of output.9  We assume that c is below the demand price 
p(Q) for some positive quantity Q. 
We look for a symmetric equilibrium in output.  Suppose the symmetric 
equilibrium quantity choice is q*.  Each firm’s profits are 
(4) λ−−−+=π
≤λ+
cqq*)q)n(q(pmax
Bcq
i 1 . 
We first consider the quantity choices of the firms, which are characterized in 
Lemma 1. 
                                                 
9 We do not include retained earnings as part of the budget constraint because borrowing against the 
prospect of future earnings for investment is notoriously difficult.  New and speculative investments are 
rarely funded by borrowing.  It would clearly be an improvement to model the dynamic process of 
deployment with investment and debt. 
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Lemma 1: There is a unique Cournot equilibrium, and it is symmetric and has industry 
output Q satisfying: 
(5) 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=λ+≥
<λ+=
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ε−
Bn/cQif
Bn/cQif
c
)Q(n
)Q(p
0
0
11  
 
All proofs are contained in the appendix. 
When the financing constraint does not bind, condition (5) can be expressed as 
(6) c
n
n)Q(p
1−ε
ε= .  
The solution to (6) is the unconstrained Cournot outcome. Let Qc be this solution. The 
associated profits are 
(7) λελε
ελπ −−=−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=−−= 1
11
1
)(
n
cQ
nn
Q
c
n
n
n
Q
c
n
Q
Qp ccccc . 
If the financing constraint binds,  
(8) c
n
n
c
Bnp
1−ε
ε≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ λ− , 
and profits are 
(9) B
c
B
c
Bnp
c
Bc
c
B
c
Bnp −λ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ λ−=λ−λ−−λ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ λ−=π . 
We assume that license prices will have to satisfy voluntary participation of firms. The 
maximum that any firm would pay for a license is a level leading to zero profits. We 
denote the zero-profits license price by λ0: 
(10) 
n
QcQp ))((0 −=λ  
Burguet & McAfee, June 2, 2008 9
We will discuss in Section 4 the existence and uniqueness of this price. For the 
moment, assume it is indeed unique. 
3. Optimal prices 
What is the optimal license price λ?  We will consider two scenarios, depending 
on whether the firm profits are counted as part of welfare.  If the firms are local firms, 
and their profits are fully counted as part of the local welfare, then it is appropriate to 
maximize the total gains from trade.  In this case, giving the licenses away (which 
relaxes the firms’ financing constraints) maximizes welfare.  If, in contrast, the profits of 
the firms are not part of the objective of the licensor, the results are more interesting.  
For sufficiently elastic demand, an auction is optimal, and we will derive a sharp 
characterization of how elastic demand must be.  
If the licensing authority counts firm profits in welfare, the welfare measure, as a 
function of output, is composed of three terms, the consumer surplus, the firm profits, 
and the license revenue.  If Q is the quantity produced by the industry, welfare is: 
(11) ( ) ( ) .dxc)x(pcQdx)x(pn
n
Qc)Q(p
n
Qndx)Q(p)x(pW
QQQ
∫∫∫ −=−=λ+⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ λ−−+−= 000  
In this case, the closer is output to the level where price equals marginal cost, the 
more efficient is the solution.  Since price exceeds marginal cost at the unconstrained 
solution Qc, and price is increasing (weakly if the financing constraint does not bind) in 
λ, W is maximized over non-negative λ at λ=0, or giving the licenses away free.  More 
generally, any λ small enough that the financing constraint does not bind maximizes 
welfare.  If the financing constraint binds strictly, the value of λ is too high to maximize 
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welfare.  Note that this could entail a negative value of λ if the financing constraint binds 
at λ=0. 
Now consider the consumer surplus, which doesn’t count firm profits, but does 
count license revenues; we’ll refer to values of λ that maximize this measure as optimal.  
Consumer surplus (plus license revenue) is probably a more realistic objective function 
for regulators in general.10 More relevant to our particular problem, this is an objective 
function that better fits declared intentions of governments when assigning 
telecommunication license.11  The objective function for the government is in this case 
(12) . ( ) λndxQpxpRCS Q +−=+ ∫
0
)()(
CS (and then CS+R) is a convex function of output when 
(13) . 0)()( <′′+′ QpQQp
Note that (13) guarantees the second order condition (2).  CS is convex 
whenever a tax on a monopoly is only partially passed on to consumers, which is a 
common assumption. The condition (13) is satisfied by concave, and in particular linear 
demand.  
  Denote the level that leads to the financing constraint just binding by λB.  Note 
that λB is defined by 
(14) c
B Q
c
B
n =− λ . 
                                                 
10  We assume the shadow cost of public funds to be 1. In fact, our results would be strengthened under the more 
plausible, standard hypothesis that this cost is above 1.  
11 For instance, for the British government, the main goal was the "efficient utilisation of the spectrum and 
the enhancement of competition between operators to the benefit of consumers." (page 6 of The Auction 
of Radio Spectrum for the Third Generation of Mobile Telephones, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, October 1991 http://www.nao.org.uk/intosai/wgap/0102233.pdf). Revenue, although less openly 
recognized, was also welcomed. 
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For values of λ < λB, CS is (locally) independent of λ. Indeed, firms are effectively 
unconstrained, and their output will be equal to the Cournot output. For λ > λB, (14) is 
the expression of output as a function of λ, for general values of Q and λ. Thus,  
(15)  
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
<
>⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
=+
B
B
n
Q
Qpc
c
nc
dQ
QdpQ
c
n
d
RCSd
λλ
λλε
λ
 if
 if
)(
)()(
)(  
and CS+R is increasing for λ < λB. Thus, a sufficient condition for optimal prices to be 
strictly larger than λB is that 0>− ε
pc  at Qc. But at that level of output, (5) is just 
satisfied with equality and any reduction in quantity would violate (5). Therefore, 
Lemma 2: The value of λ that maximizes CS+R  is at least λB. If n
nQc
1)( +>ε , then the 
CS+R-maximizing value of λ exceeds λB. 
For sufficiently elastic demand (evaluated at the Cournot quantity), an optimal 
license price should cause the financing constraints to bind, if at that price firms earn 
positive profits.  If λB > λ0, an auction maximizes consumer surplus, since the financing 
constraint is not salient (all prices firms voluntarily agree to pay are not financing 
constrained.)  The interesting case is when λB < λ0. In this case, should the government 
attempt to extract the highest possible price for the licenses?  
CS+R is convex in λ for λ > λB if CS is convex in output (because (3) holds with 
equality). Thus, in this case we can conclude immediately from Lemma 2 that λ0 is 
indeed the optimal price if the conditions of that lemma are satisfied.  If CS+R is 
increasing at λB it is also increasing at any λ > λB.  This demonstrates: 
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Theorem 1: If CS is convex and 
n
nQc
1)( +>ε , then λ0 is the optimal price. 
The interpretation of Theorem 1 is that if demand is just a little elastic and 
satisfies the usual condition that a monopolist absorbs part of a per unit tax, then 
auction prices are not too high to maximize consumer surplus, even if financing 
constraints strictly bind.  That is, even if the critics of auctions are right that auctions 
interfere with service deployment, if demand is slightly elastic, consumers prefer the 
auction revenue to wider deployment and less revenue. 
There is at least one commonly-assumed class of demand functions of interest 
that does not satisfy (13): constant-elasticity demand functions. For this class, CS is 
concave. Let us now assume that CS is concave in output, so that CS+R is concave in 
λ, for λ > λB. Concavity of CS+R guarantees that CS+R is increasing in λ < λ0 if it is 
increasing at λ0, which occurs when 0>− ε
pc  when evaluated at the quantity 
associated with λ0. The zero profits condition (10), together with budget binding (3, with 
equality) implies that 
(16) λ−= B
B
c
p .  
Therefore, 
Theorem 2: If CS is concave and at the price λ0,
0λε −≥ B
B , then λ0 is the optimal price. 
Theorem 2 relates variables that may readily be estimated: the elasticity of demand at 
the quantity associated with the auction price, overall expenditures (budget) and license 
prices. Under the assumption of CS concavity, this allows us to check whether a 
realized price is excessive.  When CS is concave the hypothesis of Lemma 2, that 
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n
nQc
1)( +>ε , is not sufficient for optimality of λ0. However one can easily check that it 
is a necessary condition for λ0 to be optimal. 
4. Auctions, budgets, and prices; some comments on robustness  
In this section we first analyze the existence and uniqueness of zero-profit prices and its 
relationship with auction prices.  Afterward, we relax the assumption of equal budgets 
and discuss alternative market models.   
Let K represent “output capacity” after any payment for a license. That is, a firm 
that has budget B and pays the price λ has an output capacity equal to 
c
BK λ−= . Note 
that once licenses have been acquired, if firms have capacity in excess of Qc/n, then the 
output in the market will be Qc. If firms have a capacity K < Qc/n, then output will be nK. 
Using this notation, we can represent a firm’s market profits as a function of capacity 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
≤−
=
otherwise
n
Q
cQp
n
Q
KifKcnKp
K
c
c
c
m
))((
))((
)(π  
The function πm is concave to the left of Qc, and is constant beyond that point. It attains 
a maximum at the K equal to (1/nth of) the monopoly output. We have represented this 
function as the thick line in Figure 1.  
In Figure 1 we have also represented several straight lines with slope –c. Take 
any of these and consider its intersection with the horizontal axis. For a firm with a 
budget given by c times this intersection, this linear function measures for each capacity 
level the license fee that would leave the firm with that level of capacity. Then, the 
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intersection between the function )(Kmπ  and the straight line corresponding to B 
defines a zero profit license fee when firms have a budget B.  
Note that )(Kmπ  is zero at K=0. Also, we know that the (left) derivative of )(Kmπ  
with respect to K at K=Qc/n is 
cQpcQpQQp cccc −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−=−+ 11)())(()(' ε . 
From (6), this is equal to 
.
1
11
1
11 −
−−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +− εε
ε
ε n
nc
n
nc   
This value is negative but larger than –c when 1>ε  at Qc. Thus, since )(Kmπ  is 
concave in K, when 1>ε  at Qc there exists one and only one zero-profit capacity/output 
(and then, one zero-profit λ ) for each value of B. Therefore, whenever the conditions of 
Lemma 2 or Theorems 1 and 2 hold there is no ambiguity as to what is the zero-profit 
license price.12
In this model, the relationship between the auction price and the zero-profit price 
when the latter is unique is trivial. Any standard (only winners pay) auction has a unique 
pure strategy equilibrium where all firms bid this price.  Comparative statics for this price 
with respect to B are equally straightforward, and are illustrated by Figure 1. The 
auction price is (weakly) increasing in the budget.  
Next, we discuss asymmetries in budgets.  We will refer to the firms by their 
ranking, from higher to lower, in terms of budgets, and let Bi denote firm i’s budget.  It is 
                                                 
12 When 1<ε  at Qc there may be multiple (up to three) zero-profit prices λ  for some values of B. 
Intuitively, when license price rise, the budget constraints cause the quantity to fall, and inelastic demand 
implies that revenues rise.  This entails revenues being an increasing function of the license prices, which 
can offset the increased license price. 
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an expositional simplification to assume that no two firms have the same budget.  Also, 
assume that any two firms that obtain a license pay the same price. 
In the appendix (Lemma 3) we show that given the license price and any set of 
winners, only the firms with smallest budgets will be constrained and only if the smallest 
budget is insufficient to meet the license price and the Cournot quantity. Firms with 
larger budgets all produce the same, larger output. Since the market price is common to 
all firms, this means that firms with larger budgets will have larger profits. The 
immediate implication is that if a firm j is willing to pay some given price for the license 
in order to compete with some set of n –1 other firms in the market, then any other firm 
i<j should be also willing to pay that price for the license. 
A price λ will clear the market if it is below the profits of firm n and above the 
profits of firm n + 1, both computed in competition with firms 1 through n – 1. There is an 
interval of such prices.13 Define λ0 as the largest of all these prices, and λB as the price 
at which the financing constraint of firm n just binds, when competing against firms 1 
through n – 1.  
Assuming that firms 1 through n win a license, we can replicate the major results 
of Section 3. Indeed, for any price lower than λB, CS+R is locally independent of λ, 
under this construction. Also (15) defines now a lower bound for the slope of CS+R with 
respect to the license price. To see this, note that the slope of revenues with respect to 
λ is not affected, but the slope of Q with respect to λ is lower: When not all firms are 
financially constrained by the license price, then an increase in this price reduces Q by 
                                                 
13 An oral auction, or a sealed bid auction with full information, would tend to pick the low end of this 
interval. 
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less than 
c
n . Therefore whenever (15) is positive, at some value of Q (and P), the slope 
of CS+R is positive at that value. It follows that Lemma 2 and Theorems 1 and 2 still 
hold with asymmetric financial constraints. 14  
We have modeled the market for telecommunications as a simple Cournot 
market. It may be argued that telecommunications are characterized by network 
externalities, which may render reductions in output more costly. For instance, one 
could postulate, as in Amir and Lazzati (2007), a demand function P(Q;Z), where Z is 
the expected size of total output (network), 15  and assume that P1<0, and P2 >0, where 
Pi represents the partial derivative of P with respect to the ith argument.16 In equilibrium, 
Q=Z.  
Let 1
21
1 >= +PP
PA . Then, the condition of Lemma 2 becomes 
n
A
n
Qc
1
)(
+
>ε , 
where now 
ZQ
PQ
ZQpQ
=
−=ε
1
1);()( , i.e., the elasticity of demand for a fixed expected 
total output. 17 Therefore, the sufficient conditions for auctions to be optimal (when the 
consumer surplus is convex) are even weaker, when we consider the effects of 
externalities.  
Finally, we should note that assuming price competition would not have an effect 
on the qualitative results, as is some times the case in oligopoly models. Indeed, as 
                                                 
14 However, it may be in the interest of the government to assign a number of licenses smaller than the 
technically feasible, selling fewer licenses at higher prices.  With symmetric firms, more licenses are 
generally preferable if more licenses produce a more competitive outcome. 
15 Z may be a measure of network quality, when it is the size of total industry investment what matters for 
consumer, and not individual firm investment. 
16 Amir and Lazzati (2007) show that under mild conditions a Cournot equilibrium exists, although some 
additional assumptions are required for uniqueness. 
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long as firms are constrained and have a total capacity nk=Q below the competitive 
quantity, in a Bertrand equilibrium all firms set prices equal to P(Q). Then, equation (15) 
still holds, except that λB should now be defined as the license price that leave firms 
with just enough resources to produce the competitive quantity, instead of the Cournot 
quantity. Thus, Theorem 2 holds without changes. Theorem 1 also holds with only 
substituting the competitive quantity for Qc. It is also straightforward to show that 
whenever the elasticity is above 1 at the competitive quantity, λ0 is uniquely defined in 
this alternative setting, and then λ0 is the auction price. The only caveat here is that 
under these assumptions, firms would be capacity constrained at the auction price if 
and only if their budget constrains also at zero license prices. In any case, the 
conclusion is unchanged: if demand is not very inelastic, auctions maximize the sum of 
consumer surplus and revenues even when they reduce output. 
We have modeled the firms as setting quantities; in some circumstances investments 
set quality rather than quantity.  For the United States, where some areas lack cell 
coverage, marginal investments may extend coverage to new areas and therefore 
increase quality for existing customers who are roaming, while increasing quantity by 
offering service to new customers.  When investment is used to put cell towers closer 
together, a greater capacity of calls can be carried simultaneously and this corresponds 
closely to the model’s assumptions.  The case of 3G represents a mix – an increase in 
the quality of data transmission but increases in quantity of voice and data.  Given that 
quality is often modeled as a kind of quantity, the present model has a natural, if 
somewhat strained, quality interpretation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 This would be the elasticity that would be measured by most empirical tests.  
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5. The European 3G Experience 
Licenses for spectrum intended for 3G (third generation) cellular telephony usage 
were assigned beginning in March 2000 with Spain.18 The first auction of 3G licenses 
took place in the United Kingdom and ended in April 2000. The four incumbent GSM 
operators (Vodafone, BT's O2, France Telecom's Orange, and T-Mobile) and a new 
entrant, Hutchison, each won a license. Prices were considered astronomically high, 
because the prices exceeded the prices for the US PCS spectrum, in spite of the US 
spectrum having fewer constraints on usage. About the same time as the UK auctions, 
the stock price index of telecoms started declining (see EC 2002, exhibit 26). By the 
time the next auction took place in the Netherlands, only three months later, telecom 
firms had lost about 25% of their equity value. This time, each of the five incumbents 
(KPN, O2, T-Mobile, and Dutchtone, Orange) won a license. A month later, when the 
German auction closed, telecom share prices had fallen even further, to about two-
thirds of their March 2000 value. In Germany 6 licenses were sold.19  Again, each of the 
four incumbents (T-Mobile, O2, Vodafone-, and Mobilcom, which was partly owned by 
France Telecom) obtained a license, and two new firms, Quam (a joint venture of 
Telefonica and Sonera) and Orange, entered the market. The next auction took place in 
Italy, in October 2000. By then, the stock market index of European Telco’s had already 
lost more than 40% of its value, as compared to a loss by the American counterparts of 
about 25% during the same period. 
Licenses included obligations to deploy 3G networks with minimum coverage 
requirements and deadlines. For instance, license holders in the UK were required to 
                                                 
18 For a description and analysis of the recent regulation of telephony in Europe, see Grzybowsky (2005). 
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have a network in place that covered 80% of the UK population by the end of 2007. In 
Sweden, the conditions of the beauty contest pushed this to 99.98% of the population 
by the end of 2003. In the Netherlands, the requirements included coverage of at least 
60% of the population by 2007, and in Germany 25% of the population by the end of 
2003 and 50% by the end of 2005. 
Immediately after the first wave of license allocations as the year 2000 ended, 
the mood in the industry changed. As some say, the internet and telecom bubble burst. 
The prospect of profitable 3G services receded. If only a few months earlier the market 
was in the peak of the optimism about the telecom industry, by the end of 2000 and 
beginning of 2001 the articles in the financial press were filled with comments about the 
struggling of telecom firms with debt crises.  The debt taken to finance the acquisition of 
licenses was often identified as an important contributory factor of the telecom debt 
crisis.  With the equity markets hostile to telecoms, most European telecoms borrowed 
a substantial amount of money.20  
In this landscape of diminished expectations, the launching of 3G services was 
delayed. In fact, with the unsuccessful exception of Hutchison's 3, the launching of 3G 
services did not begin until mid-2004. Mobilcom and Quam in Germany and Orange in 
Sweden had failed to meet their roll-out obligations and consequently had to return their 
licenses.  
In all countries, firms lobbied for delays in their 3G coverage obligations, and in 
most places they succeeded.  Sweden allowed a year extension on the requirement of 
(virtually) full population coverage (from the end of 2003 to the end of 2004).  Even this 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 Twelve blocks were on sale, and each firm could buy two or three of these blocks. Thus, the number of 
licenses was endogenously determined. 
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extended deadline was not met. In addition, operators received permission to sharing 
their networks, so that the originally envisioned structure of one independent, competing 
network per license was lost. Thus, network sharing agreements among carriers were 
approved by national governments, including the UK, Sweden, Germany, and the 
Netherlands.  As of February 2005, population coverage of 3G networks had reached 
only 85% in Sweden, 75% in the UK, and less than 60% in the rest of Europe. 
The demand elasticity is a critical input to the theory.  Earlier studies in wireless 
telephony obtain elasticity estimates in the range 0.50-1.0.21  However, early adopters 
of cellular telephony probably had relatively inelastic demand, so that demand at lower 
prices is likely substantially more elastic than these estimates suggest. For instance, 
using data from 1999 to 2001, Ingraham and Sidak (2004) estimate wireless services 
price elasticity in the range 1.12 and 1.29. In addition, the demand for 3G services such 
as video and gaming is likely more elastic than wireless telephony, because the luxury 
component is larger.  Wallenius and Hämäläinen (2002) estimate the elasticity of 
demand for 3G services to be in the range 1.4-1.7, although their source is not 
identified. One could argue that the elasticity of the demand for 3G services can be 
better estimated by measures of the elasticity of internet access than by measures of 
telephony. The former are consistently higher, typically above 2 (see, for instance, 
Goolsbee 2006). In a recent study with Finish data obtained from a real-world 
experiment, Gao, Hyytinen, and Toivanen (2005) estimate the per-minute price elasticity 
of wireless internet access to range from 1.78 to 2.28 (length of connection) and around 
1.59 (number of connections).  
                                                                                                                                                             
20 The Economist, January 25, 2001. 
21 See, for instance Rodini et al. (2002) or Hausman (1999), (2000). 
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If the demand elasticity were 1.5, then auction prices would maximize consumer 
surplus (including license revenues) for all if license prices accounted for less than a 
third of the firms' budgets, even if the firms were financially constrained and consumer 
surplus concave.  If, as in the usually assumed case, consumer surplus is a convex 
function of quantity, then at an elasticity of 1.5, two licenses is sufficient to insure that 
auctioning is optimal.   
A proxy for the firms’ budgets is the sum of estimated cost of deploying a 3G 
network plus the license fee.22  Taking Western Europe as a whole23, the total cost of 
building networks for all licensees (in the 2000-01 sales) has been estimated at 140B €, 
whereas total cost of licenses was 120B €,24 a ratio of license to total cost of almost ½. 
However, most of the cost of licenses is accounted for by the British and German 
auctions, which raised total of 86B €.  In the UK, license prices total 36B €, compared to 
an estimated 21B € needed in network investment. License fees appear close to two-
thirds of the total cost (license plus network) of deploying 3G services.  Similarly, in 
Germany the license cost was 50B € and estimated cost of the network only 34B €, so 
that license fee accounted for 60% of deployment cost.25 In the rest of the countries that 
used auctions to assign licenses, the ratio of license fees to total estimated costs 
ranged from 12% in Greece to 34% in the Netherlands. 
                                                 
22 This figure ignores marketing and other costs of operating a network, but also ignores network sharing.  
As it treats the cost of building a network as fixed, it tends to over-estimate the budget. 
23 All figures used in this paragraph are taken from EC (2002) 
24 Our source is EC (2002).  The figures refer to 3G network deployment, and do not include upgrades 
and replacement investment for 2G networks. The estimated total investment in this category needed for 
the period 2000-2015 is 90B €. 
25 These numbers are corroborated by the experience of O2, the originally BT mobile company. It is 
estimated that it spent a total 4B ₤ (approx. 6B €) in building its 3G networks, mainly in the UK and 
Germany. It spent around 15B € acquiring its British and German licenses.  License fees in both markets 
represented more than 70% of its estimated budget (network cost plus license fees) for both markets. 
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The formula in Theorem 2 permits calculating the elasticity necessary to justify 
auction prices, assuming the financing constraints bind.26  If CS is concave, auction 
prices maximized consumer surplus in the UK only if the elasticity of demand exceeded 
2.7.  In Germany, the critical elasticity is about 2.5.  These elasticities exceed most 
estimates for the elasticity of demand for 3G services, suggesting that the prices 
perhaps were too high to maximize consumer surplus, unless financing constraints for 
the firms did not bind or consumer surplus is convex.  In other countries, however, the 
critical elasticity is 1.5 or less, suggesting that an auction maximized consumer surplus 
no matter what assumption is placed on consumer surplus. 
Given the problems that telecom firms faced with borrowing in the 2001-2005 
period, it seems plausible that the firms were financially constrained. But, were they?  
Financing constraints ought to create a negative correlation between license prices and 
build-out.  In the countries with the two highest prices per capita, the UK and Germany, 
services were deployed relatively quickly, but services were rapidly rolled out in 
Luxemborg and Sweden as well, which had low prices.  Because the nations with the 
highest per capita demand will attract higher auction prices, higher budgets and faster 
deployment, assessing the existence of financing constraints empirically is challenging.  
Moreover, the effect of financing constraints is generally to slow deployment, rather than 
reduce it permanently, so that the time of allocation is also important in the attempt to 
empirically assess financing constraints.  Given the small number of countries, and the 
possibility of endogeneity in the choice of allocation method, an attempt to empirically 
assess the existence of financing constraints is a daunting task. 
                                                 
26 Note that Theorem 2 references the elasticity at the zero profits or auction price, so that the relevant 
comparison is to the prevailing elasticity estimates, at least in the countries that auctioned the licenses. 
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6. Conclusion 
Both experience with telecommunications companies and corporate finance 
research indicates that financing constraints are a fact of life in many bidding contexts.  
In principle, frequent company complaints that high auction prices prevented the rapid 
rollout of services could have merit.  The effect of financing constraints on the 
deployment of services was examined in the context of a model of hard budgets.  
Evaluation of the effect of auction prices hinges on relatively inelastic demand, and 
auctions are optimal even when the firms are financially constrained, provided the 
auction price isn’t too large a fraction of the firms’ resources. 
Demand for 3G services is probably elastic, as  the most relevant evidence 
suggests. In that case, and even given hard financing constraints, in most countries the 
auction prices appear to maximize consumer surplus, understood as including license 
revenue.  Thus auctions appear to be the best way to allocate the licenses.  Only in the 
U.K. and Germany some doubts could remain as whether auction prices constrain the 
rollout of services beyond what is optimal, according to the theory and proposed 
demand elasticities, and this only if consumer surplus is concave. 
In the main body of the paper we have assume homogeneous quantity 
competition. In our view, the Cournot model captures salient features of the cellular 
communication market.  Capacity is determined by deployment of cell towers in most 
regions and additional capacity requires either more towers (smaller cells) or more 
spectrum.  As with Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), pricing decisions are made long after 
capacity choices.  Thus, the Cournot model seems like a reasonable starting point for 
Burguet & McAfee, June 2, 2008 24
an analysis of auctions27.  This is also the main argument that Grzybowski (2005), 
among others, advance for analyzing this industry in a Cournot model. With that said, 
however, the likely effect of increased prices is not a permanent decrease in capacity 
but a temporary decrease in capacity.  Our model can be interpreted as one in which 
delay is very costly (discount factor close to zero).  Consequently, our assumptions 
exaggerate the effects of a service reduction, which makes our finding that auctions are 
optimal apparently stronger.  Nevertheless, it would certainly be worthwhile preparing a 
formal model of the dynamic problem. 
Auctions have an additional advantage obscured by the symmetry of the model: 
auctions select the efficient service providers.  Even if demand is relatively inelastic, it 
may be desirable to auction in order to select efficiently.  However, in such a setting, 
auctions could have a perverse effect if the most efficient firms face relatively tighter 
financing constraints, because auctions favor both the efficiency and large budgets.  
Nevertheless, we expect that the advantages of auctions over random selection are 
greater when firms are differentiated than in our simple model.
                                                 
27 While there is some differentiation in services, for the vast majority of users, cellular telephony is little 
differentiated.   
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1:  For the moment, ignore the financing constraint.  Fix the output of 
other firms at iQ− ,so that profits are 
λ−−+=π − cqqQqp i )( . 
If the constraint does not bind, the second derivative of profits is 
)Qq(p)Qq(pq
)q(
ii −− +′++′′=∂
π∂ 22
2
. 
If 0<+′′ − )Qq(p i , 02
2
<∂
π∂
)q(
 since p is a demand curve.  If 0>+′′ − )Qq(p i , 
0222
2
<+′++′′+<+′++′′=∂
π∂
−−−−− )Qq(p)Qq(p)Qq()Qq(p)Qq(pq
)q(
iiiii  by (2).  
Either way, π is globally concave, so the Kuhn-Tucker condition characterizes a 
maximum. 
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Note that, if firm i is constrained, then any firm producing the quantity q less than 
qi satisfies 
0
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11)(
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Thus, if one firm is constrained, they are all constrained.  That is, either no firm, 
or all firms, are constrained.  Consequently, (2) entails that any equilibrium is 
symmetric, and satisfies 
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, by (2). 
Thus, there is a unique Cournot equilibrium. 
 
Lemma 3: For any vector (B1,B2,…, Bn) of budgets, and license price λ  there is a unique 
pure strategy equilibrium output (q1,q2,…, qn). If Bn -λ > cQc /n, then qi = Qc /n for all i. If 
Bj - λ  > c Qc /n > Bj+1 - λ  for some j<n, then there exists k j such that cq≥ i = Bi - λ  for all 
i>k, qi=q for all i<k for some value q> Qc /n, and Q< Qc. 
Proof of Lemma 3:  
As in the proof of Lemma 1, π is globally concave, so the Kuhn-Tucker condition 
characterizes a maximum:  
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Assume  Bn - λ > cQc /n. Then, if some firm i is constrained, qi > Qc /n and any 
firm producing the quantity q less than qi satisfies 
0
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Thus, if firm i is constrained, every firm j produces at least the minimum of Bj - λ  
and qi, which means that Q > Qc.  But this contradicts (2). Thus, Bn -λ > cQc /n no firm is 
constrained and then the only equilibrium is qi = Qc /n for all i. 
Now, assume Bj - λ  >  cQc /n > Bj+1 - λ  for some j<n. First note that Q< Qc  in any 
equilibrium, in this case. Indeed, otherwise at least one firm i produces more than Qc /n, 
and then the Kuhn-Tucker condition is violated for this firm. This immediately implies 
that cqi = Bi -λ  for all i>j, and Q< Qc. 
Given a set of firms that are constrained, and therefore their aggregate output, 
consider the residual demand for other firms. This satisfies the same conditions of the 
original demand function. Thus, there exists a unique, symmetric output equlibrium for 
these firms, as in Lemma 1.  
Thus, to complete the proof of Lemma 3 we only need to show that there is a 
unique set of constrained firms. Assume there is some k so that  
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for some value q. Now assume that for some k’<k, we have some other vector of 
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Note that 
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implies that Q’ > Q. Indeed, define . If 
''' kk QQ −− <
'qq > 'ii qq ≤ 'ki ≥ 11' −− > QQ
1'~ −−= QQq QQ ≤' , then Q , so that 
. Then, from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we have that  
Qq ≤+ −1~
qq ≤~
0)'()'(~)~()~(~ 11 ≥−+′=−+++′ −− cQpQpqcQqpQqpq  
and then we conclude that  as well. Now, since  '~ qq ≤
11
~''' −− +==+ QqQQq ,  
this implies that . This contradiction proves that Q’ > Q. 11' −− ≤ QQ
Then,  
qQqQ
c
BQ
c
BQQ kiik −=−>−−>−−=− '' '' λλ , 
Burguet & McAfee, June 2, 2008 33
and then concavity of π and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the equilibrium resulting in 
output Q’ contradicts the Kuhn-Tucker condition for the equilibrium resulting in output Q, 
i.e.,  
0)()( '' =−+++′ cQqpQqpq kk . 
This contradiction shows that there is only one equilibrium for each vector of budgets.  
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 Π,C 
Qc(P(Qc)-c)/n 
KQM/n Qc /n B*/c 
Figure 1 
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